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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Hoy argued in his appellant’s brief that the prosecutor committed misconduct when
he asked the jury to find Mr. Hoy guilty, especially of eluding the police, because “what we’re
really here for is to protect the public.” In response, the State claims that Mr. Hoy has failed to
show fundamental error. This reply addresses the State’s assertions that the prosecutor did not
commit misconduct in the first place and that any error is not clear from the record.
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ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct when he told the jury to find Mr. Hoy guilty of
eluding because “what we’re really here for is to protect the public.”
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Told The Jury To Find Mr. Hoy Guilty Of
Eluding Because “What We’re Really Here For Is To Protect The Public”
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Hoy argued that the prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the
“emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury” by suggesting that it is the jury’s job to protect the
public, State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86–87 (Ct. App. 2007), and that he “raise[d] the specter of
possible future criminality” of Mr. Hoy as a reason for the jury to return a guilty verdict,
State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 70 (Ct. App. 1998). (App. Br., p.5–7.) He further argued that the
misconduct was of sufficient consequence to violate Mr. Hoy’s rights to a fair trial and due
process under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, see U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; ID. CONST.
art. I, § 13, was clear from the record (see 1/22/15 Tr., p.463, L.22–p.464, L.6), and there was a
reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. (App. Br., p.5–7.)
In response, the State first argues there was no constitutional violation under the first
prong of State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). The State claims that the prosecutor’s
statement was permissible because the State had to prove, as part of felony eluding, that Mr. Hoy
drove in a way that endangered others.
[T]he prosecutor did not ask the jury to find Hoy guilty “in order to protect the
public” generally; rather, it is clear from the context in which the prosecutor made
the challenged statement that he was asking the jury to find Hoy guilty because,
by driving recklessly to avoid police apprehension, Hoy actually put the public at
risk in this case. This was proper argument.
In order to prove Hoy was guilty of felony eluding, the state was required
to prove, inter alia, that Hoy “drove the vehicle in a manner as to endanger or be
likely to endanger another person or another person’s property.”
(Compare R., p.136 (Jury Instruction No. 16) with I.C. § 49-1404(2)(c).) Telling
the jury that “what we’re really here for is to protect the public,” in a case where
endangerment of the public was actually an element of the crime, was not an
appeal to the jury to decide the case based on emotion or any factor other than the
applicable law and the evidence presented at trial. Before the prosecutor made the
challenged statement, he referred specifically to the jury instruction that required
the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “Hoy drove the vehicle in a
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manner as to endanger or be likely to endanger another person or another person’s
property” (Tr., p.461, L.22–p.462, L.3), and he summarized the evidence that
showed Hoy did so in this case (Tr., p.462, L.4–p.463, L.16). The prosecutor then
concluded his argument by reiterating that “the state did prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that” Hoy committed the eluding in a “manner likely to
endanger other people” (Tr., p.463, L.25–p.464, L.2), commenting in the context
of the eluding charge that “what we’re really here for is to protect the public”
(Tr., p.464, Ls.2–3), and asking the jury to find Hoy guilty because “that’s why he
is here because he put the public at risk” (Tr., p.464, Ls.4–6). Because the
prosecutor’s statement related directly to an element of the crime the state was
required to prove, and because the statement was both preceded and followed by a
request to find Hoy guilty, not to protect the public generally, but because the
evidence showed Hoy put the public at risk in this case, Hoy has failed to show
any error at all, much less error of constitutional significance. . . .
(Resp. Br., pp.8–9.) In short, the State argues that, because the prosecutor sandwiched an
impermissible statement between two correct statements, he did not commit misconduct.
The State’s argument is without merit. It asks this Court to ignore what the prosecutor
actually said—“what we’re really here for is to protect the public” (Tr., p.464, Ls.2–3)—in favor
of what the State wishes the prosecutor had said—“convict Mr. Hoy because he put (past-tense)
the public in danger.” But there is no way around it: The prosecutor did not refer to what
Mr. Hoy had done in the past, but what he could do in the future. The jury could not “protect the
public” that Mr. Hoy had allegedly put in danger in the past by convicting him of eluding.
What’s more, it is not the jury’s job to protect the public in the first place—that task is left to law
enforcement. The jury’s job only job was to determine whether Mr. Hoy was guilty. By telling
the jury otherwise, the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury and implied
that the Mr. Hoy would commit future crimes if the jury did not convict him. The prosecutor’s
claim that “what we’re really here for is to protect the public” amounts to misconduct, and the
State cannot dodge that misconduct by rewriting it.
As for Perry’s second prong, the State asserts that Mr. Hoy did not object because the
prosecutor’s statement was proper and,
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It is also far from clear that Hoy’s decision to not object was anything
other than tactical. While it is true, as Hoy’s appellate counsel points out, that
Hoy was “a pro se defendant” (Appellant’s brief, p.7), Hoy’s pro se status is
irrelevant, both factually and legally, to the question of whether Hoy made the
conscious decision to forego an objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument at
trial. . . .
(Resp. Br., p.10.)
While Mr. Hoy agrees that, as a pro se defendant, he must “follow the court’s substantive
and procedural rules,” see State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 636 (2007) (citing
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832, 95 (1975)), he disagrees that this Court must overlook
his pro se status when considering whether his failure to object was a strategic decision.
Regardless of his pro se status, Mr. Hoy’s failure to object to the prosecutor violating his
constitutional rights could not possibly have any tactical advantage. The State’s suggestion to
the contrary fails.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hoy respectfully asks that the Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand to
the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016.

/s/_________________________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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